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Essay
Beyond the Best Black: The Making of a Critical Race
Theorist at Yale Law School
LUKE CHARLES HARRIS
In Kimberld Williams Crenshaw's lead article in this Commentary
Issue she contends that critical insights on race often develop out of
institutional struggles over the terms upon which racial politics are
engaged and normalized My pathway to Critical Race Theory (CRT)
confirms this idea. Thus, this comment traces the making of a critical race
theorist at Yale through the contested discourses around race, meritocracy
and affirmative action. These discourses not only shaped my experiences
while I was at Yale, they also influenced my thoughts on these matters
throughout my career as I transitioned from private practice back to life in
the academy. Accordingly, in this Essay, I hope to uncover how the
debates about affirmative action-debates that I understood to be about
whether a guy like me had a legitimate place at Yale as both a JD. and an
LL.M student-helped me to understand the ways in which patterns of
racial power were rationalized and naturalized in elite academic settings
and by extension, throughout society at large. To accomplish this goal, I
will borrow aspects of Crenshaw's theory offrame misalignment so as to
reframe the terms of this debate.
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Beyond the Best Black: The Making of a Critical Race
Theorist at Yale Law School
LUKE CHARLES HARRIS
I. INTRODUCTION
I remember when I discovered that somewhere a name had been
invented for the work that I did. The year was 1989 and I was still
celebrating my intellectual emancipation from corporate law by my weekly
ritual of reading every journal that related to race in the United States I
could get my hands on. I remember to this day coming across Jon
Wiener's article, Law Profs Fight the Power, in the Nation Magazine! I
quickly devoured the article about a new brand of law school intellectuals,
a group that I learned called its disicpline "Critical Race Theory (CRT)."
The stark import of the revelation of this group was only eclipsed for me
by the fact that if I was reading this article it meant that others around the
country were also reading it as well; and that a new and potentially
transformative intellectual movement in the legal academy was on the
horizon.
Suddenly I was brought into contact with the work of Kimberld
Williams Crenshaw, Charles Lawrence, Mari Matsuda, Pat Williams, and a
host of others. I had been aware of the work of Derrick Bell and Richard
Delgado since I was a law student at Yale in the early to mid-1970s, but I
had no idea that a full-fledged intellectual movement focused on race in the
United States had emerged in the legal academy. Suddenly I was no longer
alone in the wilderness thinking about issues of law, race, and power.
There was a community of scholars I could identify with. I had people, a
posse one might say, even though they did not know they had me. I had
never been to a CRT workshop or conference, but I could relate to them in
a deep and intimate way because they were probing the same concerns that
had captured my imagination as a law student at Yale.
Out of what appeared to be nowhere I now had discovered a
professional identity. When I finally had the opportunity to explore the
origin of the CRT movement, I found that the struggles over faculty
* Associate Professor of Political Science, Vassar College. Co-founder of the African American
Policy Forum. Saint Joseph's University, B.A. 1973; Yale Law School, J.D. 1977 and LL.M. 1980;
Princeton University, Ph.D 1995. I would like to thank Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Oscar Blayton,
Jon Feingold, Eve Dunbar, and Kiese Laymon for helping me to carefully think through the
implications of the experiences that I had at the Yale Law School in the early to mid-1970s.
' Jon Wiener, Law Profs Fight the Power, NATION, Sept. 4, 1989.
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recruitment and curriculum that had given rise to insurgency at Harvard
echoed the very same struggles at Yale Law that had prompted me to
explore issues of race, power and equal citizenship throughout my career.
While at Harvard in the 1980s the issues revolved around the
diversification of the curriculum and minority faculty hiring, at Yale in the
1970s the issues revolved around minority admissions. The response at
both institutions was a push back rooted in a putatively universal
conception of meritocracy.
Crenshaw's Harvard story tracks fairly closely the unfolding of the
story that I tell herein about Yale, yet with some key differences that I will
explore below.2 Our stories are, of course, generationally distinct. The
ten-year gap in our stories perhaps explains the different objects of our
struggles: student diversity usually preceded the struggles over curriculum
and faculty, although one doesn't always lead to the other. Moreover, our
stories are about two major law schools that differ in terms of their size and
insularity. The rarified atmosphere of Yale Law School, perhaps
exacerbated by its intimacy, created the allure of having been designated
for the best of the best, even if for many African Americans membership in
this community came with significant costs.
Interestingly, our stories also diverge in terms of the distinct
institutional histories with regard to radical law projects at Harvard and
Yale. Harvard was for a time the site of a hotbed of radical legal thinking
that never quite flourished at Yale. By this, however, I do not mean to
suggest that the mere presence of radical thinkers alone led to the
development of CRT, as might be inferred from other narratives about its
origins that link its emergence to the purging of left-wing scholars at Yale
who found homes in other academic institutions. Instead I am suggesting,
as Crenshaw argues, that the institutionalization of Harvard's radical
projects throughout the 1980s created a kind of staging ground for CRT
that many of us at Yale were never exposed to.
It should be noted that the generational difference here meant that the
critical tools we had available to "read" the institutional rhetorics that
justified racial exclusion were more limited for us at Yale in the 1970s than
those available to our Harvard counterparts in the 1980s. Crenshaw notes
that by the 1980s a whole generation of students were matriculating into
law schools having been exposed to ethnic studies and student formations
that refocused the energies of earlier generations from segregation to the
2 KimberI6 Williams Crenshaw, Twenty Years of Critical Race Theory: Looking Back To Move
Forward, 43 CONN. L. REv. 1253, 1262-77 (2011).
See generally LAURA KALMAN, YALE LAW SCHOOL AND THE SIXTIES: REVOLT AND
REVERBERATIONS 11-97,273-318 (2005).
4Richard Delgado, Liberal McCarthyism and the Origins of Critical Race Theory, 94 IOWA L.
REV. 1505, 1508 (2009).
terms upon which integration would proceed.5 In this context, after the
1960s the dismantling of segregation had receded as the primary objective
of civil rights protest, and institutional forms of racial power became the
focal point of the first wave of student activism.
Crenshaw's generation benefitted from the institutionalization of some
of these victories in the form of special study programs, organizations, and
other university-based and community opportunities, all of which
facilitated the development of loosely shared discourses on the
contemporary forms of racial exclusion.6 This latter point, in fact, leads to
my own take on one of the hypotheses posed by Crenshaw's lead article.
Crenshaw argues that while critical sensibilities about racial power had
been generated and circulated throughout the academy in various forms
during the twentieth century, it was the institutionalized opportunities for
confronting and integrating these sensibilities into the legal academy that
led to sustained efforts to self-consciously reshape legal education.'
My own pathway to CRT conijrms that critical insights on race often
develop out of institutional struggles over the terms upon which the racial
politics of the institution are engaged and normalized. This was certainly
the case at Yale. The absence of an organized cohort and a conceptual
umbrella to mark this kind of critique, however, reduced such efforts to the
mere protest of particular individuals, and therefore robbed it of a certain
coherence that might have projected it outward. Still, our activism carried
with it the imperative to engage the discursive logics of processes that led
to our marginalization at Yale and the exclusion of Blacks and other people
of color whom we believed to be equally qualified to become members of
the law school community. Our intellectual and activist work lay at the
center of CRT, and in exploring these issues in the specific context of
Yale, I had been a practicing critical race theorist without knowing it. As a
result, my eventual encounter with CRT was a deeply refreshing and
energizing moment wherein I was able to identify the intellectual home to
which I belonged.
Accordingly, this comment traces the making of a critical race theorist
at Yale through the contested discourses around race, meritocracy, and
affirmative action. These discourses, which began in earnest before my
matriculation to Yale, were transformed by the shift from a vision of
minority admissions rooted in elite discretion and social responsibility on
the part of the Yale faculty to a vision grounded in a reformist discourse
forged in civil rights advocacy and a critique of unwarranted forms of
racial exclusion articulated by activist Black students in the late 1960s.
This shift brought the backroom debates among Yale faculty firmly into
Crenshaw, supra note 2, at 1265-66.
6 See, e.g., id. at 1288 (discussing the various CRT conferences that sprung up in the mid-1980s).
'Id at 1260.
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the public square and with it the limited notions of merit and desert that
framed both the conservative and liberal perspectives on affirmative action.
Front and center in these debates was a generation of students of color-
mainly Black students-who grappled with the contradictory messages
delivered by an institution that had long practiced a form of liberalism that
permitted certain departures from the traditional conception of academic
meritocracy in the law school setting so long as the terms of these
departures never challenged the overall appropriateness of those criteria.
This discourse not only shaped my experiences while I was at Yale
earning a J.D. and an LL.M, it also influenced my thoughts on these
matters throughout my career as I moved from private practice back to life
in the academy. In this response essay, I hope to uncover how the debates
about affirmative action-debates that I heard and that I fully understood
to be about whether a Black student like me actually belonged at Yale-
helped me to comprehend the ways in which patterns of racial power were
rationalized and naturalized in elite academic settings and by extension,
throughout society at large. To accomplish this goal, I will borrow aspects
of Crenshaw's theory of frame misalignment-that is to say, her analysis
of why it is important to reframe the misframing of key questions of law,
politics, and institutional practices when they serve to distort the nature of
the public discourse under consideration.9
As a student who was not likely to wind up at Yale, someone who
moved from the bottom of society to the so-called top, over time I would
become keenly aware of the ways that my own presence at Yale was
framed. I was struck that my presence was not a reminder of the unnatural
and political nature of race and class stratification in American society; and
that instead it was seen as a reaffirmation of the basic fairness-and
benevolence-of the American social order. That the presence of others
like me-markedly different in terms of class privilege, access, and
cultural capital-was the cause of soul-wrenching debates about who
really belonged at Yale confirmed my general outsider's stance that
something was amiss in this environment. The contradictions between the
myths of equal opportunity and the racial realities created a kind of theater
of the absurd. In so doing, it provided people like myself with some
distance from which to view the racial stereotypes that had distorted the
picture of who and what in fact the Black students actually symbolized at
Yale in the immediate aftermath of the Civil Rights Movement.
8 See generally KALMAN, supra note 3; Macklin Fleming & Louis Pollak, The Black Quota at
Yale Law School, 19 PUB. INT. 44 (1969) (printing an exchange of letters between Fleming and Pollak).
9 Crenshaw, supra note 2, at 1259.
II. GOD AND SOUL AT YALE:
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AS AMERICAN NOBLISSE OBLIGE
Yale, Harvard, and a few other outstanding academic institutions were
not, even in the darkest ages of segregation, completely organized as
white-only arenas. While they were hardly innocent as to the production
of knowledge that reflected and shored up the American racial status quo,
at the same time, unlike their Southern or lower tier counterparts in other
regions of the country, they sometimes provided avenues for a small
number of Blacks to gain entry into a professional arena reserved for the
tiniest fraction of even white America. Many of these students were
quietly admitted under differential criteria long before the term affirmative
action or the social revolts of the sixties had emerged.'0
Indeed, Yale Law School had employed the use of an affirmative
action-like program for Black students since 1948." Its policy had been to
admit any Black student who in its judgment "was qualified in the sense
that he or she could successfully complete the three years required to
obtain a degree."l 2 Although that turned out to be no more than six
students in any given year, it was still a significantly larger number of
Black students than were admitted by the vast majority of Yale's peer
institutions at the time.13 Moreover, the fruits of this experiment had been
bountiful: numerous Black alumni had, "'upon entering the profession,
speedily demonstrated professional accomplishments of a high order."' 4
In her history of Yale Law School, Professor Laura Kalman describes
Yale's departure from the use of the traditional indicia of merit as
reflecting the faculty's collective orientation toward standardized
measures, and, in particular, their
[doubts about] the predictive value of the LSAT and college
grades for all "whose childhood and family background are
remote from the experiences and aspirations of (primarily
white) middle class America . . . . (L)ong before such
skepticism was fashionable," the faculty had given "less
weight to the LSAT and the rest of the standardized academic
white apparatus in assessing black applicants.""
The results of this alternative conception of meritocracy were
staggeringly effective. Between 1948 and 1965, Yale admitted, among
1o See generally KALMAN, supra note 3; Fleming & Pollak, supra note 8.
" See generally KALMAN, supra note 3; Fleming & Pollack, supra note 8.
12 KALMAN, supra note 3, at 103 (internal quotation marks omitted).
13 Laura Kalman, The Dark Ages, in HISTORY OF YALE LAW SCHOOL 154, 165 (Anthony T.
Kronman ed., 2004) ("The Yale admission committee['s] . . . African American track of its special
admissions program .. . traditionally yielded up to six black students.").
14 KALMAN, supra note 3, at 117 (quoting Louis Pollak).
" Id. at 100.
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others, A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., (for whom I would later serve as a law
clerk), Marian Wright Edelman, Eleanor Holmes Norton, and Haywood
Bums, all of whom would go on to have distinguished careers.' 6
This quiet practice of minority admissions embodied an orientation,
however, that was something quite distinct from the way Black students
and other civil rights advocates would come to frame affirmative action in
the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s. The hallmark of the earlier forms
of differential admissions was discretion, expert judgment, and to some
extent, a hint of noblesse oblige. In ways that presaged the eventual
demise of affirmative action in Bakke, this idea of finding the diamonds in
the rough was not animated by notions of social justice writ large, as in
efforts, for instance, to dismantle a racially stratified social order.17 In fact,
some saw affirmative action as an effort to shore up the social order by
creating a snaall Black elite that would emerge as leaders in their own
communities.'" Whatever the underlying motivation, it was inevitable that
the admission of such small numbers of Blacks would eventually be
regarded as nothing more than mere tokenism.
It should come as no surprise, then, that this vision of affirmative
action would later give way to hotly contested ideological struggles when
the number of Black matriculants to Yale significantly increased in the late
1960s.19 Student activists in this cohort framed admission to the law
school in terms of basic civil rights perhaps without recognizing that this
approach directly challenged the framework of expert discretion that had
underscored the faculty's earlier admissions practices.20  While both
perspectives in some sense justified departures from the standard entry
criteria (which were themselves changing from generation to generation), 2 1
16 Higginbotham was the seventh African American Article III judge appointed in the United
States, and the first African American judge on the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania. Appointed by President Carter, he later served as Chief Judge of the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals from 1990 to 1991. Higginbotham was also a distinguished scholar and he taught at
both the University of Pennsylvania and the Harvard Law Schools. Marian Wright Edelman founded
and is the president of the Children's Defense Fund. About Us, CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND,
http://www.childrensdefense.org/about-us/leadership-staff/marian-wright-edelman/ (last visited Apr.
15, 2011). Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton is currently serving her eleventh term as
Congresswoman for the District of Columbia. And Hayward Burns is the former Dean of the City
University of New York Law School at Queens College and was a long-time Civil Rights advocate
who worked with Martin Luther King, Jr. He represented the black radical Angela Davis against
charges of kidnapping and murder, and coordinated the defense for inmates indicted in the Attica
prison riot. Tragically, he was killed in a 1996 automobile accident in Cape Town, South Africa while
attending a conference on democracy and international law.
17 See KALMAN, supra note 3, at 101 (describing how Howard Law School accused Yale of
"cherry-picking" those Black students "interested in studying law").
" Id. at 101-02.
'
9 Id. at 103.
20 See id. (characterizing prospective minority law student applicants as those who would not be
admissible under "traditional criteria").
21 The LSAT was actually a relatively new standard introduced in 1947. See William P. Lapiana,
Rita and Joseph Solomon Prof. NY Law School, Keynote Address at the 1998 LSAC Annual Meeting:
the student perspective differed dramatically from the faculty perspective
in that it was premised on a constitutional right.22
This right was forged in an idea of what it meant to be free of unfair
and discriminatory academic barriers in the admissions process to the law
school. The ultimate fairness of the mainstream criteria, however, had
never really been fully interrogated by the Yale faculty, even though it had
chosen to depart from the use of those criteria in the case of the
beneficiaries of affirmative action.23  Thus, while subject to a limited
critique, those criteria-LSAT scores and GPAs-unfortunately continued
to be the gold standard for all those who were admitted to the law school.24
This idea of meritocracy would have serious consequences for Blacks
and other nontraditional students as their numbers increased in the late
1960s through the mid-1970s.25 But, its potency to the faculty could have
been anticipated. As Kalman noted, academics "who attributed their
careers to [traditional understandings of] meritocracy remained devoted to
it and understandably remained unconscious of its and (their own) blind
spots." 2 6 Down the road these blind spots would distort faculty perceptions
of affirmative action. The failure to fully re-conceptualize the role of the
standardized criteria would eventually contribute to the sense that Yale's
expanded outreach program had resulted in the "preferential treatment" of
Blacks and others who had gained admission as beneficiaries of affirmative
action.27
III. THE TRANSITION YEARS: 1967-1970
It is important to recognize that as American apartheid was in the
process of being formally dismantled in the 1950s and 1960s, Yale Law
School was on the side of racial progress. Its faculty supported the
nonviolent Civil Rights Movement and embraced the hope that the courts,
and especially the Supreme Court, could promote effective social change.2 8
On campus, however, in the late sixties the faculty's faith in the law was
A History of the Law School Admission Council and the LSAT (May 29, 1998) (reprint available at
www.1sac.org/LSACResources/Publications/PDFs/history-lsac-Isat.pdf) (detailing the history of the
LSAT).
22 See KALMAN, supra note 3, at 102 (citing Ronald Dworkin's view that law school admissions
should not be based on "merit"-an inherently obscure term).
23 Id. at 102-03 (noting that the assumption that the LSAT was culturally biased could not be
tested due to insufficient collection of data).
24 See, e.g., id at 118-19 (describing how at Yale, the law school part of the measure of
"academic competence" used a combined weighted GPA and LSAT score).
25 For a critique of the traditional admissions criteria, see Luke Harris et al., BriefofAmici Curiae
on Behalf of a Committee of Concerned Black Graduates of ABA Accredited Law Schools, 9 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 5 (2003) [hereinafter Harris et al., Brie] (co-authored by Vicky Beasley, Devon Carbado,
Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Luke Charles Harris, et al.).
26 KALMAN, supra note 3, at 201.
27 See infra Part VII.
28 KALMAN, supra note 3, at 104.
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often not matched by a high level of satisfaction-on the part of students-
with the ways in which they were being trained to become lawyers. Many
students were dissatisfied with the law school experience. They found the
use of the Socratic method "'more stifling than liberating"' and they
wanted to become equal partners in governing the school.29 The faculty,
however, would resist these demands. Simply put, "professors who had
applauded student activism aimed at the opponents of civil rights disliked
becoming its target."3 o
Then shortly after President Lyndon Baines Johnson signed the Voting
Rights Act in 1965,31 the Watts urban rebellion exploded into the
American consciousness. Its impact was enormous and it filtered all the
way into the corridors of the Yale Law School. As Kalman describes,
"[i]nspired by the social unrest around them, a vision of democracy and
citizenship, and a sense of their school's historic importance as an
innovator in legal education, Yale students of the late sixties branded law
professors hierarchical, accused them of racism and sexism, and disrupted
law school life."32
Black students such as Otis J. Cochran, the head of the Black Law
Student Union, called for an increase in minority admissions and pushed
for the hiring of Black professors, a multicultural curriculum, and a
student lounge/office space that was their own. Some faculty received the
demands as a threat. Cochran remembers hearing that Robert Bork
"likened BLSU members to the Gestapo." 34 He could not understand,
however, how he and eleven other "scared-ass students [could] be
compared to the Gestapo." He suspected, however, that what the faculty
actually feared was their message.
Whether out of fear, guilt, or responsibility, Yale publicized the
expansion of its race-conscious admissions program "at a crucial period in
the history of affirmative action." 36 In the wake of the assassinations of
Robert F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and in the midst of the
massive social unrest of this period Yale stepped forward. A young
University of Chicago professor Owen Fiss recalled "that academic
lawyers everywhere followed Yale's experiment." The question
remained, however, how would that experiment be perceived, and how
would its purpose be articulated?
29 Id. at 72 (quoting Robert Stevens).
'
0 Id. at 80.
31 Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965).
32 KALMAN, supra note 3, at 6.
33 Id at 111. It is crucial to understand that up to this point Yale Law School still lacked a single
Black professor on its faculty.
3 4 Id at 112.
3 Id. (quoting Otis J. Cochran).
36 Id. at 118.
3 Id.
IV. ENTERING YALE LAW SCHOOL: STAGE LEFT
I was one of the "beneficiaries" of Yale's expanded affirmative action
program. I knew from the beginning that I was an unlikely matriculate to
Yale-I was Black and I had not grown up being told that I was marked
for success. If anything I was told just the opposite: that I should keep my
head down and my expectations low. Perhaps that is why once I got to
Yale I was struck by the implications of what it meant to be considered one
of the so-called best Blacks admitted through its racially targeted
program.38
I soon sensed that something was wrong with the way in which
minority admissions programs were framed, and that this something was
not just a problem with the framing of its critics. It was a problem as well
for those who were affirmative action's advocates-a problem rooted in an
unwarranted assumption that such programs were inherently preferential in
nature. This sensibility no doubt related to what it meant for me to
confront the idea that a system of preference had been put into place for
Blacks to gain entry to the law school. It was as though the presence of so-
called disadvantaged minority students naturalized the rights of others to
be there as well as the conditions of segregation out of which we had
come.
No doubt my outsider status illuminated my perspective on these
matters. While I was not alone in this regard, it is perhaps fair to say that I
was a somewhat unusual Black student at Yale in the early 1970s. I was
the product of a broken home, I had been raised on Welfare, and I was a
graduate of a dysfunctional public school system in an urban community
where I was considered to be too academically inept to take a full load of
college prep classes. Born in 1950 at the tail end of American apartheid,
my career prospects for the future looked dim. Brown4 0 and its progeny
had not yet been realized, and the educational opportunities ahead of me
appeared to be meager at best.
My first five years in public school had taken place in a segregated
four room school-house in Merchantville, New Jersey that served
"colored" children from kindergarten through sixth grade. Four teachers-
including one who also served as the school's principal-were charged
with the responsibility of providing a basic education for us in a school that
had few human or material resources. This sort of separate and decidedly
38 STEVEN L. CARTER, The Best Black, in REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 47
(1991).
39 While Jim Crow in the United States is normally not referred to as a system of formal
apartheid, the effect of legal segregation in the United States was to create an apartheid regime. See
ROBERT J. COTTROL, RAYMOND T. DIAMOND & LELAND B. WARE, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION:
CASTE, CULTURE, AND THE CONSTITUTION 34, 49 (2003) (discussion of the rise of the Jim Crow era
and segregation, characterizing the fight against Jim Crow laws as a fight against apartheid).
4 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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unequal educational experience had theoretically been repudiated by a
unanimous Supreme Court in Brown in 1954,41 the year before I had
entered kindergarten. But, like school districts across America, the one in
my hometown recognized that the Supreme Court's mandate of "all
deliberate speed' 2 meant that it would not be compelled to vindicate the
constitutional rights of the children in my neighborhood any time soon.
By the time I was in junior in high school, my family had moved to
Camden, New Jersey-one of the poorest urban communities in the United
States. In Camden, I experienced an "integrated" education in an
underfunded inner city public school system. Like most of the Black and
Brown children in the city, in my youth I was placed on the vocational
track. Guidance counselors who looked like me saw in me the same
limited opportunities that I had imagined for myself. Rather than
encouraging us to "be all that you can be," they steered legions of young
Blacks like me away from college preparatory classes and a professional
career. At the time, even to me, this seemed to make sense. As far as I
knew, no one in my family had ever gone to college.
Thus, coming out of high school, I was hardly considered to be a
candidate for "the best and the brightest" pool out of which Yale Law
School would recruit. Yet four years later, I would be seated in that
rarified atmosphere, excited to embark upon an extraordinary intellectual
journey that would present me with unexpected lessons.
V. YALE OPENS ITS DOORS A BIT WIDER
Born at the tail end of the Jim Crow era, my life was framed by that
reality. The neighborhoods I had grown up in, the elementary and
secondary schools I had attended, and the opportunities that were available
to me had all been shaped or misshaped by segregation. I knew by the
time I matriculated to Yale that I was lucky to have gotten out of Camden,
that an extraordinary set of unlikely circumstances had made it possible for
me to have been in the queue when Yale expanded the scope of its
affirmative action policy. A myriad of factors paved the way of my own
trajectory from the experience of segregation and poverty to Yale,
including: the hard work of a loving great Aunt who nurtured me to
adulthood, the constructive interventions of a devoted and positive mentor
outside of my high school setting, the targeted race-conscious admissions
policies that were developed in the late 1960s across the United States, 43
and the impact of the Civil Rights and Black Power Movements on my
41 Id at 494 (finding separate educational facilities to be inherently unequal in part because "the
policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group").
42 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
4 See, e.g., Robert A. Sedler, Affirmative Action, Race, and the Constitution: From Bakke to
Grutter, 92 Ky. L.J. 219, 219 (2003).
sense of self esteem and who I thought I could become in American
society. This set of circumstances empowered me with the desire, the self-
confidence and the willpower to completely turn my life around.
I also realized that what was special about my own story was not the
product of anything truly exceptional on my part. I was, to be sure, the
first to go to college in my family, but clearly that was not because I was
the most talented person in my entire family line. In fact, I knew that I
could not make a strong claim to have been the smartest, or the best and
brightest student in any row of students I had shared a class with in any of
the schools I had attended growing up. I was just extremely lucky to have
been positioned to benefit from the crack in the door that Yale provided.
For me to have gone through that door convinced of my singular right to be
there would have required me to reject everything I knew about all of my
friends and family members who were not so fortunate.
I knew that there was a certain arbitrariness about who could walk
through this door, and that the long shadow of unjust deserts from the era
of segregation not only cast doubt on the legitimacy of the exclusion of all
those who "but for the grace of god goes me" people, it also raised serious
questions about those on the inside of elite institutions like Yale reared on
the other side of the race and class divide. Since I knew full well that the
exclusion of millions of people like me was an extension of the
consequences of segregation, if not its very logic, I was similarly ill
disposed toward the legitimacy of the traditional institutional terms of
inclusion. I could hardly think that the many unwarranted obstacles that
served to unfairly exclude people of color from the opportunities that I was
able to take advantage of were unjust while, at the same time, being
convinced that those who lived inside the Emerald City had a natural right
to be there.
Having a natural "denaturalizing" orientation toward Yale, I assumed,
perhaps naively, that Yale's outreach to people like me was a reflection of
its own efforts to rethink its practices and customs in the aftermath of Jim
Crow. Yale's attention to race struck me as nothing more than a
reasonable path forward given the fact that race clearly mattered in
complicated and important ways. After all, patterns of racial exclusion had
been structured into the very fabric of our society in systematic ways for
centuries so as to exclude people of color from positions of power and
authority across all aspects of life in the United States. So, in my view,
major American institutions would have to develop the tools to dismantle
this process. The thought that taking account of race would be viewed as
bias itself, as a departure from some myth of merit, did not jive with my
own life story. I had seen too many arbitrary obstacles along the way to
Yale-from a tracking system in the public schools that disproportionately
seemed to target, Black, Brown and working class students to a Welfare
system that barely enabled one to secure life's basic necessities.
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Thus, by the time I arrived at Yale, my life's trajectory had caused me
to have a strong set of expectations about what it would mean to take
seriously the lived experiences of people of color in the aftermath of
American apartheid. I would soon discover, however, that quite to the
contrary Yale's faculty had assumed that it would only need to make
marginal changes in this new era. Rather than envisioning major social
reform as an imperative and a constitutional right, Yale faculty tended to
think that it could find its diamonds in the rough without a major
reconceptualization of its vision of meritocracy.
VI. ON BEING THE OBJECT OF THE DEBATE
By the early 1970s, Yale's experiment with an expanded affirmative
action program was up and running at full speed. Like most students, I
was completely unaware of how my entrance and subsequent presence
would be cast at Yale. Nor was I aware that the drama unfolding there in
light of its minority admissions programs had been written and set in
motion long before I would dare to whisper the idea that I might attend
Yale even to myself.
Once at Yale, not surprisingly, I encountered an exceptional array of
students in an extremely cosmopolitan educational setting-including
many young people who would in the long run become prominent figures
on the American landscape. Witness, for instance, Yale Law School
Professor Steven Carter, the author of Reflections of an Affirmative Action
Baby;" Supreme Court Justices Samuel Alito and Clarence Thomas; Lani
Guinier, the first tenured woman of color at the Harvard Law School; and
Catherine MacKinnon, who would go on to become a major feminist legal
theorist.
Yale opened doors for all of us. Yet, at the same time, there was
something clearly amiss; a threat was in the air, a hint or a whisper perhaps
that minority admissions came at a cost, the precise contours of which
were initially a challenge to decipher. But what the faculty thought, more
often than not, would filter down to us in one way or another. Like the
great Motown singer Marvin Gaye used to sing in the late sixties, "[we]
heard it through the grapevine."
VII. THE IDEOLOGICAL CONTOURS OF THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
DEBATE AT YALE IN THE POST-CIVIL RIGHTS ERA
When Yale expanded its affirmative action program in the aftermath of
student protests, reservations and outright objections came to the fore
within its own faculty almost immediately. 45 Core members of the "faculty
4 CARTER, supra note 38, at 15.
45 KALMAN, supra note 3, at 119.
remained convinced that equality and meritocracy conflicted. 4 6
Mischaracterizations and open opposition to affirmative action were
articulated across a wide array of ideological perspectives on the faculty.
Alexander Bickel and Louis Pollak represented the two poles on this
continuum.4 7
Some faculty members, such as Bickel, felt that Yale was already
doing everything in its power to admit Black students. Bickel argued that
Yale was "making 'the most vigorous efforts to find Negro applicants who
met our qualifications, rather generously construed in their favor' and he
opposed affirmative action programs."" He was against what he
understood as "reverse discrimination" and quotas that "rewarded the
intellectually inferior and [that] brought in students who could not keep up
with the majority.""9 Indeed, Bickel's misconceptions about affirmative
action-rooted in false parallels-"awakened memories of the quotas Ivy
League schools had used to restrict the number of Jewish students" in an
earlier era.so
The gold standard-that is to say the traditional indices of merit-
served as the universal measure by which Bickel determined who belonged
at Yale, and who did not. He was concerned that a limited pool of
"qualified" candidates would make it impossible for Yale to significantly
increase its Black student population now that other major law schools
were also in the market looking for them. He deplored the idea that Yale
would utilize what he saw as "double standards.""
Interestingly enough, there is no record that Bickel opposed the smaller
scale minority admissions program that had been developed in 1948. But,
as the number of Black students increased, and their politics appeared to
grow more "radical," he became a vocal opponent of these policies.
Perhaps this is a testament to the sense that the faculty was no longer fully
in control of the admissions process, and the reality that this new
generation of students was less timid than their predecessors and had
entered the law school with a sense that they had a right to be there. One
wonders if the ambivalence and hostility that fueled the debate among the
faculty on this issue, at least in part, reflected these concerns. After all,
there was little or no reason to believe that the minority students who
attended Yale under its expanded program had actually entered the law
school under a set of differential criteria that made them more likely to fail
than their earlier counterparts.
46 Id. at 201.
47 Id. at 113 (describing Bickel's views); see also id. at 102; Fleming & Pollak, supra note 10, at
50-52 (articulating Pollak's views).
48 KALMAN, supra note 3, at 106 (quoting Alexander Bickel).
49 Id. at 101.
50 Id.5 1Id at 115.
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Lost entirely in Bickel's analysis was any interrogation of the limited
utility of the traditional admissions criteria or any recognition of the
meaning of the greas success of the Black alumni at Yale from 1948 to
1965-a group whom Kalman suggests had, "upon entering the profession,
speedily demonstrated professional accomplishments of a high order."5 2
Based on the performance of the prior generation, one might have thought
that Bickel's fears would have been put to rest. It appears, however, that
this was not the case. The power and influence of the traditional
conception of meritocracy seemed to outweigh the limits of its
usefulness-even in an academic environment wherein the faculty had
exhibited the unusual foresight to already have successfully diverged from
the rigid use of those measures for over a quarter of a century. Indeed,
Yale faculty across an array of ideological perspectives would harbor such
concerns.
Professor Harry Wellington, who would later become Dean of the law
school shared the same reservations, and was worried that Yale was
"taking people who are ... unqualified.", 3 Clyde Summers, a liberal labor
law scholar, argued in published work and in personal conversations with
students, that race-based affirmative action programs were "'an unreal
solution to a real problem."' 5 4 His solution was to send the students of
color to the good local or regional schools where they could compete with
white students who were at their same level. 5
Professor Louis Pollak, on the other hand, was a vigorous and
enthusiastic liberal supporter of affirmative action both on campus and in
print. In an exchange of letters that was subsequently published in the
Public Interest he firmly objected to the critique of affirmative action
offered by Judge Macklin Fleming, a member of the law school's
executive committee. Judge Fleming had "queried [Yale Law's]
abandonment of an objective system of merit based on intellectual aptitude
(painstakingly evolved over a period of decades)." He had an undying
faith-even if there was little or no evidence to support it-in the
universality of the traditional admissions criteria that was not offset by
Yale's history of prior success with race conscious affirmative action
programs.
Professor Pollak, on the other hand, knew better. He acknowledged
that history and argued that "the country must [continue to] train more
African Americans for leadership positions and [that] lawyers were [key]
Id. at 117.
"Id. at 115.
14 Id. at 202 (citing Clyde Summers, Preferential Admissions: An Unreal Solution to a Real
Problem, 1970 U. TOL. L. REv. 377 (1970)).
55Id.
56id
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leaders."5 Pollak had
a strong sense that [the law] was a profession that had, in one
way or another, managed to freeze blacks out, and that now
was the time when [the legal] profession, perhaps more than
any other slice of responsible American life, had to help
bring about a real restructuring of where blacks stood in
society.
Yet even Pollak's support was tarnished by a distinct form of liberal
paternalism. Thus, in defending affirmative action, he actually conceded
that, as a general rule, its beneficiaries were not the equals of their white
student counterparts. Indeed, for that reason, he argued that "'if the
number of [Black] students with prior educational deficiencies is a minor
fraction of the total student body,' the learning environment would not
suffer.""
Rather than questioning the objectivity of the traditional criteria,
Pollak implied that black students were in fact academically weaker than
their white counterparts, even as he passionately defended Yale's
program.60  Embedded in such defenses of affirmative action is the moral
ambiguity that surrounds a defense of it that does not squarely confront the
limits of the so-called standardized criteria. Indeed, instead of offering
such a critique, Pollak left a huge cloud hovering over the heads of
affirmative action's beneficiaries61 based on a set of academic
qualifications developed during the era of American apartheid that were
not designed to decipher the capabilities of the members of subordinated
groups. At the end of the day, we were left to wonder what liberals like
Pollak actually meant when they acknowledged the bias of the traditional
criteria on the one hand, while contending, on the other hand, that the
" Id. at 117.
58 Id. at 102 (internal quotation marks omitted).
9 1d. at 117.
soId. at 117-18.
61 Id.; see also Harris et al., Brief supra note 25, at 9 ("[H]eavy reliance on standardized aptitude
test scores constitute built-in racial preferences for White applicants."); Luke Harris & Uma Narayan,
Affirmative Action and the Myth of Preferential Treatment: A Transformative Critique of the Terms of
the Affirmative Action Debate, 11 HARv. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 24 (1994) [hereinafter Harris &
Narayan, Affirmative Action] ("Moreover, many of the criteria that are unquestioningly taken to be
important impartial indicators of peoples' competencies, merit, and potential, such as test scores, not
only fail to be precise measurements of these qualities, but systematically stigmatize these individuals
within institutions in which these tests function as important criteria of admission."); Luke Harris &
Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action as Equalizing Opportunity: Challenging the Myth of Preferential
Treatment, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: AN ANTHOLOGY, BLACKWELL PHILOSOPHY ANTHOLOGIES (Hugh
LaFollette ed. 1997) [hereinafter Harris & Narayan, Equalizing Opportunity] (discussing the
unsupported belief that affirmative action policies deviated from the standards of merit and only
benefited minority and female applicants); Claude M. Steele, Thin Ice: Stereotype Threat and Black
College Students, ATLANTIC, Aug. 1999, at 44 ("[R]acial and gender stereotypes, floating and abstract
though they might seem, can affect concrete things like grades, test scores, and academic identity.").
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"Law School had bent its admissions standards in the case of blacks." 62
Needless to say, the attitudes of the Yale faculty foreshadowed the
character of the law school experience for Black students. In fact, faculty
attitudes and not our actual level of performance sometimes colored the
way some of us viewed ourselves. Thus, in the midst of an uncommonly
rich academic setting there were potential landmines that could turn the
law school experience into an emotionally and academically troubling one
for Black students. These landmines were embedded in disparate places.
They were sometimes reflected in the attitudes of students of color who
had internalized a negative self-image in part as a function of the mixed
messages they got from the faculty. At other times, they could come in the
form of a threat, such as when the BLSU challenged the law school to
increase the number of its Black students. At one point, we were told that
if we went public with our critique of Yale's minority admissions program,
Yale might release our overall GPAs and LSAT scores. The suggestion
was that even though our scores made us the best Blacks, this information
would reveal to the world that we were, in fact, inferior to the best whites.
Contestations might be subtle, but they were often corrosive.
Sometimes they were between students and faculty members, and
sometimes between Black students themselves. When and where these
landmines might be set off was often impossible to discern. But, then,
higher education has always presented people of color with bewildering
obstacles beyond the ordinary ones that everyone else has to face. No
generation of Black students in the United States has ever been able to
circumnavigate academia without being under assault in one way or
another. In this case, the assault related to what it means to pursue the
quest for postgraduate education while a national debate unfolds about
your capacity to do so-a debate fueled, in part, by respected members of
your own faculty-some of whom are actually advocates for affirmative
action. How was one to fit comfortably into this environment?
Fitting in at Yale might have been much easier to accomplish if the
faculty had embraced Otis J. Cochran's basic insight on what the presence
of Black students meant at the time. Speaking on behalf of the Black Law
Student Union, he argued as follows:
The BLSU object[s] to the "colonial benevolence" of [the
idea] that "high-risk" black students were compromising
academic quality: "We assume that Yale's admission policy
with respect to Blacks is not a 'benign' double standard at all,
but a hard-headed and correct assessment of the loss that the
Law School will suffer if it allows a culturally biased test ...
62 KALMAN, supra note 3, at 201 (internal quotation marks omitted).
[to determine who does and who does not get admitted]."
Instead, however, Black students continued to be assessed on the basis
of a gold standard that had proven to be fools gold in the past. It turned out
that we were at the center of a debate about the idea of meritocracy in
contemporary America, but only as objects. We would play little or no
role in defining the terms of a dialogue at Yale Law School about our
competence. To be sure, it was very much a debate about Black students,
but the terms of it were almost entirely shaped by the faculty.
At its core, it was a debate between whites who ranged in political
perspective from conservative to liberal. It was a debate over the moral
and constitutional viability of affirmative action wherein the antagonists
disagreed about whether or not the programs were lawful but shared a
sense that, at least as a general rule, Blacks were not fully the equals of
their white counterparts. In this way, the terms of the debate reflected the
inadequacies of the liberal defense of affirmative action-a defense
without an institutional/structural analysis that served to promote a kind of
racialized hierarchy to the extent that it failed to adequately dislodge the
belief that departing from the use of the traditional admissions criteria for
Blacks and other people of color was necessarily a form of "preferential
treatment."
It was a debate that symbolized the breakdown of a liberal consensus
on the faculty on the question of race-based affirmative action programs. In
this sense, it was a debate about who ought to successfully gain admission
to a kind of gentlemen's club as a function of the discretion of the Yale
faculty. Paternalism, social utilitarian goals, and concerns about the
lingering effects of past discrimination energized the discussion. And,
therein lay the problem. The debate embraced a form of elite management
on the part of the law school faculty in response to a limited conception of
the objectives of affirmative action. Moreover, for the most part, it was not
framed in the language of constitutional rights; and even when it was these
rights were supposedly forged in the context of the support of what were
perceived to be racial preferences.
Something was missing. Simply put, there was no foundational
constitutional right at stake for the beneficiaries of affirmative action at the
center of this discourse. It was more a question of noblisse oblige on the
part of the faculty. Questions about institutional discrimination within the
law school were not open for serious discussion. At the time, this struck
me as a misguided approach. I felt that the debate needed to be reframed;
and that one needed to develop a wholly unapologetic case for affirmative
action.
What was the problem? Regrettably, the debate was, in essence, a
63 id
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dialogue between two broadly characterizable positions with respect to the
idea of an academic and professional meritocracy. On one side, critics
described affirmative action as a form of "reverse discrimination" that
bestowed "undeserved preferences" on its beneficiaries.N On the other
side, advocates continued to describe the policy as a form of "preferential
treatment," but argued that these preferences were justified, either as
"compensation" or on grounds of "social utility"-most importantly with
regard to the idea of diversity.65 At the time, hardly anyone questioned the
assumption that affirmative action involved the bestowal of preferences, or
challenged the belief that it marked a sudden deviation from an admissions
process that, until its advent, operated fairly with respect to all concerned.
VIII. THE COSTS OF AN ARTIFICIALLY NARROW SET OF TERMS FOR THE
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE
As a student at Yale it seemed to me that a specter of rejection and
moral and constitutional ambivalence haunted the affirmative action
discourse. I felt compelled to uproot and transcend the terms of this
dialogue because it seemed to me to fail to capture the lived experiences
that actually informed why affirmative action policies had come into
existence in the first place. Furthermore, one could on occasion see the
disconcerting consequences of the limits of this debate on campus. The
mischaracterizations, confusion, and uncertainty surrounding these policies
left some students of color at a loss for how to handle their presence in the
law school in a healthy way. Indeed, a few felt the need to prove
themselves in ways that I always believed were inappropriate so as to
demonstrate to themselves and to others that they truly belonged at Yale.
Justice Clarence Thomas was a prototypical example of this
phenomenon. In his autobiography, My Grandfather's Son, Justice
Thomas says that he was offended by talk about how they let him into
Yale. 6 He goes on to say, however, that he felt "[y]ou had to prove
yourself everyday because the presumption was that you were dumb. And
did not deserve to be there on merit. . . . Every time you walked into a
classroom . . . it was like having a monkey jump on your back from the
gothic arches."6
Thomas's response to having internalized, at least to a certain extent,
the mixed messages he had received from the law school faculty was to
overcompensate. Thus, he took a course with Professor Boris Bitker
simply because Bitker had a reputation for failing Black students who
64 See, e.g., Lisa H. Newton, Reverse Discrimination as Unjustified, 83 ETHICS 308 (1987).
6s For a defense of racial preferences as important to the incorporation of diverse viewpoints in
our institutions, see CARTER, supra note 38.
" CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER'S SON: A MEMOIR 74-75 (2007).6 7JOHN GREENYA, SILENT JUSTICE: THE CLARENCE THOMAS STORY 94 (2001).
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deserved to fail; and Thomas wanted to show that he had no reservations
about his capacity to do high quality work. I did not then, nor do I now
support such actions. At no point while I was at Yale did I think that one
should take to heart the inappropriate insinuations about the limited
capacities of minority students; or that one should literally embrace the
suggestion that the beneficiaries of affirmative action engage in super
extraordinary efforts in order to persuade those who hold such stigmatizing
views that we are brilliantly meritorious and competent after all.
The latter suggestion, however, has been made by other distinguished
Yale Law School graduates besides Justice Thomas. Stephen Carter, for
example, in Reflections of an Affirmative Action Baby, argued the
following:
A more immediate solution is for those students who are
admitted as a consequence of affirmative action, while on the
college campus and while in professional school and while
pursuing their careers-in short, for the rest of their
professional lives-is to bend to their work with an energy
that will leave competitors and detractors alike gasping in
admiration.
The idea here is that an exceptional work ethic will somehow serve to
undermine the negative stereotypes that sometimes surround minority
students and professionals. I have serious doubts about that however. I do
not believe that simply working extremely hard is likely to convince those
who hold stereotypical views about people of color to abandon them.
After all, even in the era of chattel slavery-when African Americans were
compelled to work under the most difficult and arduous of circumstances
without pay-they were stereotyped as lazy.70
Still, it may well be perfectly understandable why some people of
color would follow the path of overcompensation carved out by Carter and
Justice Thomas. But their path was never the only one available. For
instance, it was clear to me at the time that the solution to the stigma
problem was to fight accusations of inferiority with the truth, through
clarification and re-description, with the hope that people of good will-
who are open to another perspective-will recognize the problems with
such ascriptions. But, this was certainly not clear to all of us when we
were students. In this light, it is undoubtedly fair to say that attitudes like
those of Carter and Justice Thomas played a significant role in actually
inspiring me to push back against the narrow framing of the liberal defense
68 THOMAS, supra note 66, at 75.
69 CARTER, supra note 38, at 86.70 FAYE Z. BELGRAVE & KEVIN W. ALLISON, AFRICAN AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY: FROM AFRICA
TO AMERICA, 455 (2010).
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of affirmative action. After all, I could see that one of the difficulties with
this perspective was that it not only failed to address the need displayed by
such people to overcompensate for their presumed shortcomings, it
actually served to reinforce it.
IX. SHIFTING THE TERMS OF THE DEBATE
In my final year at Yale Law, I enrolled in the LL.M. program to work
with Professors Myres S. McDougal and Michael Reisman to begin to
develop an alternative perspective on affirmative action.n I focused on
exploring the meaning of equal citizenship in post-Jim Crow America. My
principle goal was to clarify the terms of the affirmative action debate, and,
in so doing, to develop a much more robust defense of affirmative action
policies. I sought to construct an analysis that was deeply informed by the
institutional and structural considerations that, in fact, had made
affirmative action necessary. Although I did not realize it at the time, this
work would ultimately serve as my pathway to CRT. For embedded in
CRT was a rich understanding of what it meant to fully dismantle
continuing forms of institutional racism-such as the use of biased
standardized tests in the United States-that were, more often than not,
ignored by the advocates of the liberal defense of affirmative action.7 2
I left Yale a year later with the strong desire to one day have the time
to work on developing a constitutional jurisprudence of race relations that
was as nuanced in its features as the contemporary contours of institutional
racism. After a couple of years spent as a Fulbright Scholar in England
studying British race relations and a federal court of appeals clerkship with
Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., I followed most of my classmates into
corporate law practice. But my interest in revisiting these issues-so
starkly raised at Yale-never fully abated. Thus, after just a few years, I
left Wall Street and entered Princeton's Ph.D. program in Politics to
grapple with these concerns head on.
I wanted to think outside the box, to interrogate the use of differential
71 See Renowned International Law Scholar Myres S. McDougal Dies, YALE BULL. & CALENDAR
(Apr. 22, 2011), http://www.yale.edulopa/arc-ybc/ybc/v26.n32.news. 1 .html (providing information on
the life and career of Myres S. McDougal); W. Michael Reisman, YALE LAW SCHOOL (Apr. 22, 2011),
http://www.law.yale.edulnews/WReisman.htm (providing information on the career of Michael
Reisman).
7 This assessment of the rationales developed to defend affirmative action was first articulated in
two essays that I co-wrote with Uma Narayan. See Harris & Narayan, Affirmative Action, supra note
61; Harris & Narayan, Equalizing Opportunity, supra note 61. Both of these articles offer a critique of
the compensation and diversity rationales used to defend affirmative action by its advocates, and they
focus our attention on "here and now" problems of institutional discrimination. Simply put, they
present affirmative action as an equal opportunity measure. Charles Lawrence makes essentially the
same arguments in the context of his critique of what he calls the liberal defense of affirmative action.
See generally Charles Lawrence, Two Views of the River: A Critique of the Liberal Defense of
Affirmative Action, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 928 (2001).
criteria in the context of minority admissions programs, and to develop
what I had come to call an anti-preference perspective. I nurtured this idea
in my dissertation and spelled out its implication in concrete detail in my
first several publications. At the center of these essays was a critique of
contemporary conceptions of meritocracy which assume that the
appropriate way to use standardized testing in post-apartheid America is to
act, at least to a certain extent, as though all Americans are similarly
situated, and to not fully account for the marked differences in our
backgrounds when assessing the results of the tests.74 In this arena,
genuine equality is linked to treating people who are dissimilarly situated,
more or less, the same.
I had canvassed the literature on standardized tests and learned that
they were relatively poor predictors of future performance even with
respect to their limited objective, which was to predict the variance of the
first year grades of college and professional students. Moreover, I had
found that, nonetheless, the traditional indices were used as if they actually
reflected a person's overall intelligence and could predict an individual's
long-term success in academic institutions and professional life. 76
I also knew that there was ample evidence that such tests did not
predict equally well for men and women, and that that they could serve to
discriminate against people of color as well as working class white
Americans. Hence, I questioned the idea of a putatively universal
conception of meritocracy in institutional settings in which the
performance that the test was supposed to predict was already culturally
preferenced. In this case, it was already preferenced for those who were
imagined to ideally embody the appropriate student profiles for Yale Law,
rather than calculated to embrace a vision of qualifications and meritocracy
designed to assess the vast potential of the members of formerly racially
subordinated groups-groups whose members had been unfairly excluded
from the law school for countless generations. Modest efforts to offset such
preferences seemed perfectly defensible to me. Moreover, it seemed
absolutely absurd to call efforts to offset such preferences "preferences"
for the so-called beneficiaries of affirmative action.
As Gary Peller has insightfully remarked:
" Luke Charles Harris, Affirmative Action and the White Backlash Notes: From a Child of
Apartheid, in PICTURING Us: AFRICAN AMERICAN IDENTITY IN PHOTOGRAPHY (Deborah Willis ed.,
1994); Luke Charles Harris, Rethinking the Terms of the Affirmative Action Debate Established in the
University of California v. Bakke Decision, in THE COLOR LINE: RACIAL AND ETHNIC INEQUALITY
AND STRUGGLE FROM A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (Gwen Moore et al. eds., 1999); Harris & Narayan,
Affirmative Action, supra note 61; Harris & Narayan, Equalizing Opportunity, supra note 61; Luke C.
Harris, The Meaning of Constitutional Difference in America (1995) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation,
Princeton University).
74 See Harris & Narayan, Affirmative Action, supra note 61, at 22-23.
7 1 Id. at 22.
76 Id.
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Here, the category of "merit" represent[ed] the universal,
impersonal side of [the] integrationist perception . . .. [There
was] the idea that the category of merit itself [wa]s neutral,
impersonal, and somehow developed outside the economy of
social power-with its significant currency of race, class, and
gender-that marks American social life.
This, of course, made absolutely no sense to me. In the alternative, I
constructed an anti-preference principle that could be used to distinguish
what it means to discriminate against someone from what it means to
promote equality by offsetting built in biases in the ways in which
American institutions distribute resources and goods. Toward this end, I
argued as follows:
[A]ffirmative action is not a matter of affording "preferential
treatment" to its beneficiaries, but instead an attempt to offer
them a greater equality of opportunity in a social context
marked by pervasive inequalities, one in which many
institutional practices work to impede a fair assessment of the
capabilities of those who are working class, women, or
people of color.
My objective was to dramatically reframe the terms of the affirmative
action debate. To do so, I sought to move away from justifications for
these policies that focus simply on past harms and future goals. Instead, I
targeted here and now problems of institutional discrimination. In laying
out a detailed defense of affirmative action I observed as follows:
Affirmative action policies do not offer compensation for
an entire history of racism and sexism, or even for all of their
continuing manifestations and effects. Rather, they seek to
counter some of the continuing effects of a historical
experience that impedes equal opportunity today. While the
compensation rationale suggests the metaphor of providing
crutches for individuals damaged by racism and sexism to
" Gary Peller, Toward Critical Cultural Pluralism: Progressive Alternatives to Mainstream Civil
Rights Ideology, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT, at
124, 132 (Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
78 Harris & Narayan, Affirmative Action, supra note 61, at 4. "The problem is far more
complicated than is captured by the common perspective that working-class people, women and
minorities have generally not had equal advantages and opportunities to acquire qualifications that are
on par with those of their better-off, white male counterparts, and so we should compensate them by
awarding them preferences even though they are less well qualified. Their qualifications, in fact, tend
to be under-valued and under-appraised in many institutional contexts. Moreover, many of the criteria
that are unquestioningly taken to be important impartial indicators of people's competencies, merit and
potential, such as test scores, not only fail to be precise measurements of these qualities, but
systematically stigmatize these individuals within institutions in which these tests function as important
criteria of admission." Id. at 24.
help them cross the road, the equal opportunity rationale
suggests a different and more appropriate metaphor: clearing
away obstacles that lie in peoples' paths as a result of their
class, race, or gender, so that they can get across the road on
their own. As George Eliot put it, "It is astonishing what a
different result one gets by changing the metaphor." 79
The changing of the metaphor in this case symbolized the
transformation of the terms of the debate. The focus of our concern would
shift from a story about damaged individuals to a story about damaged
institutions; and we would come to understand that we must learn to
distinguish the difference between reverse discrimination and a process of
rational differentiation that represents nothing more than the removal of
unwarranted obstacles that some Americans face that others do not.
Over the past fifteen years, other legal theorists have begun to explore
these same concerns. Lani Quinier is critiquing what she calls the
testocracy; Charles Lawrence has interrogated the liberal defense of
affirmative action; Jerry Kang has written about the importance of focusing
on here and now problems of institutional discrimination; Devon Carbado
and Cheryl Harris have explored what it means to reconceptualize and
rethink the idea of preferential treatment in the context of the admissions
process; Kimberly West-Faulcon has written perceptively about the
unjustifiable adverse impact of standardized tests on people of color; and
Kimberl6 Crenshaw has explored what it would mean to reframe the
affirmative action debate as a discourse grounded in a constitutional right
to be free of institutional forms of discrimination.so I expect, that in the
next few years the frame misalignment that surrounds and seriously
distorts the affirmative action debate will slowly disappear as we learn to
rethink the meaning of equality in the post-Civil Rights Era.
As for me, I am working on a book manuscript called Up from
Segregation: Notes from a Child of Apartheid, which is my attempt to
create what Crenshaw calls a counter-narrative to the liberal story about
meritocracy, race and affirmative action. In so doing, I hope to play a role
in regrounding this discourse in the soil of social reality, that is to say in
the actual lived experiences of the beneficiaries of affirmative action. In
this vein, through public education tools developed by The African
7 Id at 18 (internal citation omitted).
so All of these writings demonstrate the significance of my antipreference perspective. See Devon
W. Carbado & Cheryl 1. Harris, The New Racial Preferences, 96 CALIF. L. REv. 1139 (2008); Kimberld
W. Crenshaw, Framing Affirmative Action, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 123 (2007); Jerry
Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of "Affirmative Action,"
94 CALIF. L. REv. 1063, 1090-94 (2006); Lawrence, Two Views, supra note 72, at 950-55; Susan
Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future ofAffirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CALIF. L.
REV. 953, 997-1003 (1996); Kimberly West-Faulcon, The River Runs Dry: When Title VI Trumps State
Anti-Affirmative Action Laws, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1075 (2009).
2011] BEYOND THE BEST BLACK 1403
1404 CONNECTICUT LAWREVIEW [Vol. 43:1379
American Policy Forum (AAPF)-the social justice think tank that I co-
founded with Crenshaw in 1996-I have worked to develop, promote, and
infuse a complex and common sense defense of affirmative action into the
public discourse surrounding these policies. Indeed, in this light, AAPF's
animated track metaphor, The Unequal Opportunity Race,81 has helped
many people to focus upon and recognize the barriers that people of
color face that are a product of past and contemporary policies and
practices that benefit whites at the expense of the members of certain racial
minority groups. Assessing these institutional and structural barriers
represents one huge step towards a new understanding of the significance
of affirmative action policies.
X. CONCLUSION
My romance with the CRT movement was sparked by the tools it
enabled me to develop to interrogate the shortcomings of the affirmative
action debate in the United States. Toward this end, CRT has been
exceedly helpful. It has exposed me to new ways of thinking because it
recognized the value in contesting racial power when it was entrenched in
ideological rationales that framed Blacks and other people of color as
measurably unworthy. In the process, I discovered that the liberal defense
of affirmative action, rooted in theories of compensation and diversity,
actually failed to promote an understanding of the here and now problems
of institutional discrimination that account for why we continue to need
race-conscious social justice initiatives such as affirmative action.
Not surprizingly, then, as I moved from a critique of the discourse on
affirmative action at the Yale Law School in the 1970s to intervene in the
broader public debate, I found myself more and more in conversation with
CRT. It was the light at the end of a tunnel that for too long had gone
unseen, but that now illuminates new realities. Seniority systems, racial
profiling, tracking in elementary and secondary schools-like traditional
conceptions of meritocracy in institutions of higher education-could all
be viewed through a prism of institutional/structural forms of racism within
this perspective; and, consequently, one could reimagine and reframe
questions of equality in modem America.
As a result, in my own work I have been able to move away from
superficial conceptions of equality rooted in notions of reverse and benign
discrimination to focus on more significant concerns. For instance, why
are we more concerned with the diminished overrepresentation of whites in
key sectors of society than we are with the persistant underrepresentation
of people of color in almost all of spheres of life where power and
81 The Unequal Opportunity Race, AFRICAN-AMERICAN POL'Y FORUM, http://aapf.org/tool to_
speak out/track-metaphor-animated-filn/ (last visited June 12, 2011).
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authority are exercised in meaningful ways in postapartheid America. In
this sense, CRT has introduced me to truly innovative ways of
conceptualizing equality and racial justice.
But, there is more. CRT is now finding a home not only in the lives of
an entirely new generation of young scholars, but also in the lives of a
brand new generation of undergraduate students-like the ones that I teach
at Vassar College-who are now able to confront and examine its
remarkable insights on law, race and racism in classrooms in colleges and
universities across the country. Simply put, CRT's legacy is still in the
making. And, for this, we should all be eternally grateful since much work
remains to be done before we can comfortably claim to have eliminated all
of the ways in which systemic forms of racial subordination are deeply
interwoven into the social fabric of American society, not to mention an
extraordinary array of nations across the face of the globe.

